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INVESTORS' CHOICES
THE SHAREHOLDER AS ULYSSES: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON WHY INVESTORS IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS TOLERATE
BOARD GOVERNANCE
LYNN A. STOUTt
This Article evaluates two possible explanations for why shareholders of public
corporations tolerate board control of corporate assets and outputs: the widely
accepted monitoring hypothesis, which posits that shareholders rely on boards
primarily to control the "agency costs" associated with turning day-to-day control
over the firm over to self-interested corporate executives, and the mediating
hypothesis, which posits that shareholders also seek to "tie their own hands" by
ceding control to directors as a means of attracting the extracontractual, firm-
specific investments of such stakeholder groups as executives, creditors, and rank-
and-file employees.
Part I reviews each hypothesis and concludes that each is theoretically
plausible and internally consistent, and that the validity of each theory must be
established or rejected on the basis of empirical evidence. Part II evaluates the
available empirical evidence, including new evidence on charter provisions of
initial public offerings, and concludes that, as both a positive and a normative
matter, corporate takeover law is consistent with the view that directors are not just
monitors, but also perform a mediating function. Finally, Part III discusses future
directions for empirical research, identifies some pitfalls to be avoided, and
concludes that the current empirical evidence favors the mediating model.
INTRODUCTION
Shareholders are often described as the "owners" of corporations.'
Since at least the days of Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, however,
t Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law; Principal
Investigator, UCLA-Sloan Foundation Research Program on Business Organizations. I
would like to thank Bill Allen, Iman Anabtawi, Stephen Bainbridge, Steve Banks,
Lucian Bebchuk, Margaret Blair John Coates, Lynne Dallas, Mike Klausner, Bill Klein,
Lynn LoPucki, Douglas Olin, and the Honorable Leo Strine for their insights in dis-
cussions on this topic and comments on earlier drafts.
I See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (stating that "[t]he board
of directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the
benefit of its shareholder owners"); LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND POLIcY 348 (4th ed. 1998) (asserting that "shareholders are considered to be the
corporation's ultimate owners"). Nevertheless, as a number of scholars have noted,
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corporate scholars have understood that in public corporations,
shareholder "ownership" does not mean shareholder control. To the
contrary, in the typical large public firm with dispersed stock owner-
ship, control over the corporation's assets and outputs rests in theory
and in practice not with stockholders, but with the company's board
of directors.
This delegation of control poses a puzzle for corporate theorists.
The investor who uses her hard-earned money to buy shares from a
public firm relinquishes her power to determine how those funds will
be used in the future. Her personal assets become corporate assets
subject to the directors' control. It is now the directors, and not the
investor, who will decide how the firm shall be run, whom it shall hire,
and in what it shall invest. It is also now the directors, and not the in-
vestor, who will decide whether corporate earnings will be used to pay
dividends-or used instead to build empires, raise salaries, and sup-.• 3
port charities.
the metaphor of shareholder ownership is both inaccurate and misleading. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as a Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1,
3 n.5 (2002) (claiming that "ownership is not a particularly useful concept in the cor-
porate context"); Margaret M. Blair, Corporate "Ownership," BROOKINGs REV., Winter
1995, at 16, 16-17 (arguing that labeling shareholders as "owners" incorrectly implies
that shareholders possess certain rights generally associated with ownership); Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate
Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 412-13 (2001) ("Options theory destroys any notion that
shareholders can be uniquely described, in economic terms at least, as 'owners' of cor-
porations."); G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 893 (2000)
(describing the models in which shareholders are deemed owners or principals as "in-
complete"); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) ("From both a legal and economic perspective, the
claim that shareholders own the corporation ... simply is empirically incorrect.").
2 The observation that stock ownership is generally divorced from control in pub-
lic firms is often associated with ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (photo. reprint 1982) (1932).
3 Seegenerally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-315 (1999). In extreme cases, shareholders of a pub-
lic firm might overcome the hurdles to collective action described by Berle and Means
and remove an incumbent board by means of a proxy fight. A board can also lose con-
trol of a firm if a hostile bidder appears, surmounts the battery of antitakeover de-
fenses that typically surround a modern company, and ousts the directors. Yet both
proxy contests and hostile bids are rare and expensive. As a result, the directors of
most public firms as a practical matter enjoy a wide range of latitude to use corporate
assets and distribute corporate earnings in a fashion that does not help-and may even
harm-the firm's shareholders. See infra text accompanying notes 52-58 (discussing
director discretion). See generally Stout, supra note 1, at 1192-95 (describing how direc-
tors enjoy legal discretion to divert firm assets and earnings to nonshareholder groups
and how shareholders' voting and sale rights provide only limited constraints on this
discretion).
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The end result is a system of public corporate governance that has
been aptly described as "director primacy" instead of "shareholder
primacy.0 This raises the question: why do shareholders tolerate
such an arrangement? On first inspection, one might conclude that
shareholders accept director primacy in public firms simply because
corporate law requires it. Section 141 (a) of the Delaware Corporate
Code, for example, begins by stating that "[t] he business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors ...."5
Yet this sentence of section 141(a) ends with the caveat, "except as
may be otherwise provided ... in [the] certificate of incorporation."6
Delaware law accordingly treats board governance as a default rule
that can be "bargained around" in the corporate charter. In practice,
closely held companies sometimes do adopt alternatives to board gov-
ernance; public corporations, however, do not. In fact, a board of di-
rectors is a near-universal feature of the publicly held firm .
This pattern suggests that, for some reason, participants in public
corporations-including investors-value director primacy. Just as the
legendary Ulysses served his own interests by binding himself to the
mast of his ship, investors may be serving their own interests by bind-
ing themselves to boards.
This Article explores the question of how shareholders might
benefit from ceding control over their investments to boards of direc-
tors. Part I begins by surveying the widely accepted model of board
function that will be referred to herein as the "monitoring" model.
The monitoring model of the board posits that shareholders cede
4 The phrase "director primacy" has been used by Stephen Bainbridge to describe
corporate law's strong penchant for allocating control over corporate assets and earn-
ings to boards of directors instead of to shareholders. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note
1, at 6 ("Director primacy asserts that .... [n]either shareholders nor managers con-
trol corporations-boards of directors do."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2003) (dis-
cussing this pattern, but asserting that directors use their authority to serve sharehold-
e rs).-
5 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
6 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 72-73 (discussing the default nature of
most director governance rules).
Indeed, it may be a universal feature. Although alternative governance ar-
rangements are sometimes seen in closely held firms and LLCs and are a standard fea-
ture of partnerships, I have never seen nor heard of any large public firm opting out of
board governance. Even more striking, when public corporations use charter provi-
sions to modify the default rules of director authority, they almost always do so to
strengthen rather than weaken the board's power. See infra text accompanying notes 73-
76 (discussing charter provisions).
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control to boards primarily because boards are in a better position
than shareholders to police against the "agency costs" that corporate
executives would otherwise impose on firms. The monitoring model
accordingly views boards of directors as shareholder agents hired to
watch over other, less-trustworthy shareholder agents.
The monitoring model is the dominant theory of board control
today and offers many useful insights into the patterns of board struc-
ture and behavior that we observe. At the same time, however, Part I
argues that the monitoring model is seriously incomplete because it
fails to explain the fundamental attribute of public firms first high-
lighted by Berle and Means-extreme separation of share ownership
and control. Put differently, the monitoring model explains why
shareholders might hire boards of directors to advise them on how to
run the firm, and especially to advise them on how and when to hire,
compensate, and fire executive employees. It does not explain, how-
ever, why shareholders would take the additional (and radical) step of
actually relinquishing their control over firm assets and outputs to a
board that is free, as a matter of law, to ignore their wishes.
Part I argues that this separation of share ownership from control
can be explained by an alternative, but less widely accepted, theory of
board function described as the "mediating" model. The mediating
model does not reject the idea that shareholders rely on directors to
overcome the coordination problems shareholders themselves face in
overseeing the firm's executives. At the same time, however, the me-
diating model posits that shareholders do not rely on corporate
boards only to rein in executives. Shareholders also rely on boards to
rein in themselves by weakening shareholder control over firm assets
and outputs.
Obviously, weakening shareholder control sometimes works
against shareholders' ex post interests. According to the mediating
model, however, shareholders-like Ulysses-gain greater benefits
from tying their own hands in this fashion. Diluting shareholder
power-and with it, shareholders' ability to extract wealth from the
firm-may ultimately benefit shareholders by enhancing the firm's
ability to attract the firm-specific, sunk-cost investments of other im-
portant corporate "constituents," including creditors, executives, and
rank-and-file employees. The mediating model accordingly does not
view the separation of ownership from control accompanying board
governance as a problem. Instead, the model views it as a solution.
Which of these two theories-the purely monitoring board model
or the mediating board model-best captures the reality of modern
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public companies? Part II of the Article begins by observing that the
answer cannot be determined at the theoretical level. Each model of
board function is internally consistent and theoretically plausible. To
evaluate their merits, we must look to the available empirical evi-
dence.
Part II examines some of this evidence. It begins by inquiring
which model better describes the way modem corporate governance
actually functions. In many business contexts, the answer to this ques-
tion is not obvious: in a number of situations where corporate law al-
lows boards to pursue business strategies that seem to sacrifice
shareholders' interests in favor of those of other constituencies, it is
nevertheless possible to argue that these strategies actually serve
shareholders' "long-run" interests. Such long-run arguments lose
much of their traction, however, in the context that is the subject of
this Symposium-change of control transactions. In this context, the
extent to which corporate law follows the mediating model becomes
clearly visible.
Commentators who subscribe to the monitoring model accord-
ingly are often forced, in the change of control context, to concede
that takeover law is inconsistent with a purely monitoring board. In
response, they argue that this phenomenon reflects a deficiency of the
law rather than a deficiency of the model. Put differently, adherents
of the monitoring model argue that the legal rules governing change
of control transactions are defective and in need of reform.
As Part II observes, however, this latter argument runs afoul of a
second important source of empirical information about the norma-
tive value of a mediating board versus a purely monitoring board. De-
spite the enabling nature of corporate law, public firms generally
avoid shareholder primacy-enhancing "reforms," even at the initial
public offering (IPO) stage where corporate promoters have the
greatest incentive and ability to select governance rules that appeal to
outside investors. In fact, when firms do modify the default rules of
corporate governance, they almost always move in the opposite direc-
tion, selecting charter provisions that strengthen director control over
the firm. This pattern strongly suggests that investors, managers, and
other corporate participants collectively perceive director primacy as
advantageous ex ante.
Part III concludes by observing that, while the current empirical
evidence supports the mediating model more strongly than the purely
monitoring model, the question has hardly been resolved with cer-
tainty. As a result, there is much to be gained from further empirical
2003]
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inquiry. Part III points out, however, that many of the existing em-
pirical studies that have been devised to test the monitoring model are
intrinsically unable to distinguish between results consistent with the
monitoring model and results consistent with the mediating model.
As a result, new tests will have to be devised. In the meantime, how-
ever, it makes little sense to ignore the clear import of the data that is
presently available. Absent contrary empirical evidence, the mediat-
ing model should enjoy a presumption of validity.
I. Two THEORIES OF DIRECTOR CONTROL
Directors, like Rodney Dangerfield, often get no respect. Indeed,
in many discussions of corporate governance, they are implicitly de-
nied any special role in firm governance at all, and are lumped to-
gether with the firm's executive officers under the uninformative label
of "management. As a matter of law, however, the rights, privileges,
and obligations of corporate directors are quite different from those
of corporate executives.9 Corporate law-if not all corporate schol-
ars-recognizes that boards of directors perform a unique function in
firm governance.
What is that function? Detailed and explicit analysis of the
economic role played by directors in corporations is remarkably10
scarce. Nevertheless, a reader who surveys the contemporary corpo-
rate literature quickly will find that many who write in the field share a
consensus view of the role directors ought to play, at least in an ideal
8 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 23-24 (1986) (discussing the impor-
tance of "centralized management" in explaining the popularity of corporate form
without distinguishing between officers and directors). Indeed, one leading text on
business organizations does not even grant directors their own entry in the index, in-
stead instructing the reader who hopes to find information on directors to "[s]ee Offi-
cers and Directors." WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGAN-
IZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 419 (8th ed. 2002).
9 CompareDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001) (describing the rights and duties of
directors), withDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2001) (describing the rights and duties of
corporate executives and officers).
10 See Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Di-
rectors, 22J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1996) ("Part of the problem with the recent corporate re-
form debate is that it has given little attention to theories of board composition and
functioning."). As an example of this inattention, the leading text on the economic
functions of corporate law mentions boards in only a few pages and never explains
what function they supposedly perform. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 2, 3, 64, 72 (1991).
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world.1 This consensus might be dubbed the "monitoring" model of
the board.
A. The Monitoring Theory of the Board
To understand the concerns underlying the monitoring model of
the board, it is useful to start with a thought experiment: imagine a
firm with no board. In particular, imagine a large public company in
which the decisions normally made under the directors' authority
(e.g., executive hiring and compensation decisions, dividend declara-
tions, and mergers and acquisitions strategy) instead are made by the
shareholders themselves. Even a moment's reflection quickly reveals
just how unsatisfactory this arrangement would be. The typical public
firm has thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders.
How can these individuals reach a collective decision? Shareholder
voting is slow, difficult, and expensive, even with modern information
technology. In contrast, a board of ten or twelve members can meet
and vote on these issues relatively quickly, easily, and cheaply. Direc-
tor voting accordingly enjoys a clear efficiency advantage over share-
holder voting as a means of making business decisions on a regular
basis.
Director voting offers other important advantages over share-
holder voting as well. In the typical public firm, ownership is widely
dispersed, with most investors holding only a relatively small portion
of the firm's outstanding shares. As a result, few shareholders have
the incentive to devote much time to, or to acquire significant exper-
tise in, the firm's affairs. Director governance helps to address such
problems. By selecting a small group of individuals to specialize in the
firm and its affairs, compensating them for this specialization, and
providing them with information and access, director governance
permits not only more efficient decision making, but more informed
and intelligent decision making as well.
11 For rare examples of explicit discussion of this model, see MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 156-170 (1976)
(analyzing the functions of boards and concluding that their primary function is to
monitor the self-interested actions of professional managerial employees); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 3, 7 (2002) (noting that corporate scholarship has largely ignored the question
of why firms have boards and arguing that boards, as groups, are superior to individu-
als in performing the central task of monitoring the firm's employees); Dallas, supra
note 10, at 4-10 (discussing monitoring theories of the board as a curb on executive-
imposed agency costs).
2003]
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For these and related reasons, 2 there can be decisive advantages
to centralizing corporate decision making in a board of directors,
instead of leaving governance in the hands of a large, ever-shifting,
and relatively apathetic and uninformed body of public shareholders.
Yet it is important to recognize that the coordination problems associ-
ated with shareholder decision making cannot alone explain why
large public corporations have boards of directors. Efficiency de-
mands that someone other than the shareholders take the corporate
helm. That "someone" need not be a board of directors.
To develop this point, consider some of the alternative solutions
that might be devised to address the coordination and rational apathy
problems associated with widely dispersed share ownership. One solu-
tion might be governance by a subset of the firm's shareholders-say,
the ten with the largest holdings. Or, shareholders could simply rely
on the firm's executive officers to make all the decisions. After all,
corporate officers are full-time employees who are readily available to
the firm and thoroughly familiar with its business. As a result, they
can make business decisions on the firm's behalf even more effi-
ciently, and with even better information, than a board of directors.
If shareholders cared only about informed and efficient decision
making, boards would enjoy an advantage compared to shareholders
themselves, but corporate officers would enjoy an advantage over di-
rectors. For this reason, shareholders' coordination problems and the
need for more informal and efficient decision making cannot, alone,
explain why public corporations universally opt for board governance.
Efficiency and intelligence are not the only qualities shareholders
seek in centralized management, however. Shareholders are also con-
cerned about loyalty-ensuring that whoever determines the firm's
direction steers a course designed to serve the shareholders' interests.
On the question of loyalty, corporate officers suffer from a distinct
disadvantage. As employees of the firm, they will often face situations
where the course of action that is best for themselves is not best for
12 Other aspects of board structure may also promote better decisions than would
be possible through shareholder voting. For example, because boards meet in person,
and because most follow a norm of unanimity, a dissenting director at a board meeting
has a much better chance of getting her fellow directors to listen to and take account
of her views than a dissenting shareholder would have in a shareholders' meeting or a
proxy battle. This may allow boards to avoid unwise choices shareholders would ap-
prove. Other dynamics of group decision making may also make boards superior to
shareholders at assessing and evaluating business strategies. See generally Bainbridge,
supra note 11, at 1 (arguing that advantages of group decision making help explain the
use of boards).
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the shareholders. This conflict of interest is obvious in matters of ex-
ecutive retention and compensation, but it arises in other areas as
well.13 As a result, shareholders who hire professional managers to
run their firms can expect to suffer the losses. In economic parlance,
executive officers are agents, and principals who employ agents incur
agency costs.
This two-part analysis-which relies on directors' relative ability to
make efficient and informed decisions compared to shareholders, and
their relative ability to make impartial and disinterested decisions
compared to officers-provides the foundation for the monitoring
theory of the board. The monitoring model posits that the central
economic function of the board is to reduce the agency costs that ex-
ecutives otherwise would impose on the firm's shareholders. Direc-
tors are in a relatively good position to perform this function because,
compared to executives, they face fewer conflicts of interest, and
compared to shareholders, they can more easily observe executive be-
havior and take responsive action. Thus, the monitoring model views
directors as agents of shareholders who are employed to watch over
14other, less-faithful agents.
Casual empiricism supports many aspects of the monitoring
model of board function. As a practical matter, the lion's share of
business decisions in most public firms are made not by directors, but
by the company's executives, including the CEO. Directors, in con-
trast, play a passive role; boards meet infrequently, and often seem
content to follow the CEO's lead except in extraordinary cases.15 The
monitoring model of the board is consistent with this pattern, for
it views the locus of directors' superior decision-making ability as
confined primarily to areas where executive self-interest conflicts
with shareholder interests (e.g., on matters of executive hiring and
13 For example, self-interested executives might be tempted to use the firm's earn-
ings to pursue acquisitions and other strategies that enlarge their "empires," instead of
payin those dividends out to shareholders.
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 76 (describing directors as
agents of shareholders).
In some limited circumstances, corporate law also seems to call upon directors to
act as agents for the broader society by ensuring that firms obey the law. See, e.g.,
Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that the business judgment
rule would not protect directors who knowingly allowed the firm to violate the law).
15 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 108 (observing that it is "unrealistic to view directors
as making any significant number of basic business policy decisions. Even with respect
to the broadest business policies, it is the officers who generally initiate and shape the
decisions. The directors simply approve them, and occasionally offer advice or raise
questions.").
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compensation). Outside this limited context, the monitoring model
predicts that executives, not directors, will formulate business strategy
and run the firm on a day-to-day basis. Boards exist primarily for over-
sight and intervene only in extremis.
Despite its strengths, however, the monitoring model does a re-
markably poorjob in one vital respect of explaining the governance of
public firms. This is because the monitoring model fails to account
for the extreme separation of share ownership from firm control that
is the hallmark of the public firm. Put differently, the monitoring
model explains why shareholders might select a small group of inde-
pendent and expert outsiders whom the shareholders would pay to
oversee the firm's professional managers and to advise the sharehold-
ers on management's competence and loyalty. The monitoring
model does not explain, however, why shareholders would take the
additional and remarkable step of turning over control of the firm,
and all its assets and outputs, to these outsiders.
To understand this last point, it is useful to consider the case of a
highly successful firm that has retained its earnings for years. The
firm's shareholders believe the corporation cannot earn a superior re-
turn on this hoard of cash; they would prefer to distribute the money
to themselves through a large dividend. The monitoring model pre-
dicts that shareholders should be able to compel the board to do this.
After all, the board is supposedly the shareholders' "agent," and the
shareholders are supposedly the firm's sole residual claimants, enti-
tled to every penny the firm earns above the amount needed to pay
the contractual claims of employees, creditors, and suppliers.
The default rules of corporate governance do not, however, follow
the predictions of the monitoring model. Shareholders cannot pay
themselves dividends; if a dividend is declared at all, it must be de-
clared by the board.1 6 If the board refuses to declare a dividend, in
the typical public firm there is little the shareholders can do about it.
Even if the shareholders delivered a unanimous resolution requesting
a dividend to the board, the board would be legally free to ignore it.17
And any threat to vote the board out of office is likely to sound a bit
16 See DEL. CODE A,,N. tit. 8, § 170 (2001) (authorizing only directors to declare
dividends); see also Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984)
("It is settled law in this State that the declaration and payment of a dividend rests in
the discretion of the corporation's board of directors in the exercise of its business
judgTent.").
See CLARK, supra note 8, at 372-73 (stating that shareholders' voting rights are
limited and that the board is legally free to ignore most resolutions).
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hollow: proxy contests and hostile takeover bids pose little danger to
incumbent directors of public corporations with widely dispersed
shareholders and well-chosen antitakeover defenses. '
It is difficult to reconcile this fundamental reality of corporate law
with the monitoring model's hypothesis that directors are sharehold-
ers' "agents." Boards do, of course, have the power to limit how much
of the corporation's returns are allocated to its executives. But boards
also have the power to limit how much of the returns from corporate production
are allocated to shareholders.'9 Furthermore, shareholders in public cor-
porations seem to happily tolerate this arrangement, even though the
enabling nature of corporate law allows them to opt out of it.
2 °
Such observations naturally suggest that, in addition to expecting
boards to monitor executives' performance, shareholders also ex-
pect-or at least anticipate-that board governance will have the ad-
ditional effect of reducing their own ability to extract wealth from the
firm. This second aspect of board governance seems, on first inspec-
tion, to clearly work against shareholders' interests. Closer analysis
reveals that shareholders may not only tolerate, but actually prefer, to
"tie their own hands" in this fashion.
B. The Mediating Theory of the Board
To understand how shareholders can benefit by insulating boards
from their own command and control, it is important to recognize
that executives are not the only actors in the firm who can exploit
other corporate participants. Nor do shareholders always play the
role of exploited victim; to the contrary, shareholders are sometimes
the exploiters.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 53-58, 61-68 (discussing the difficulties
shareholders encounter in ousting boards).
19 The monitoring model accordingly raises, but provides no answer to, the ques-
tion, "who watches the watchers?" For example, self-interested directors might retain
corporate earnings in order to expand their own empires, rather than return those
earnings to shareholders in the form of dividends. Similarly, they might choose to
sooth employee unrest through unnecessary wage concessions, thus purchasing a
"quiet life" at the shareholders' expense. As a result, it can be argued that if the moni-
toring model is correct, the board is a dysfunctional institution because director gov-
ernance simply adds another layer of agents who are in a position to impose costs on
shareholders. But cf infra text accompanying notes 36-42 (explaining why boards
make sense under the mediating model).
20 For a discussion of alternative governance structures that would allow share-
holders to enjoy the monitoring benefits of a board without ceding as much control,
see infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
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This possibility is well-recognized in the corporate literature. Al-
though contemporary scholarship tends to focus almost obsessively on
the problem of deterring corporate executives from imposing "agency
costs" on shareholders, 21 well-developed literatures detail how share-
holders can opportunistically exploit creditors (e.g., by pursuing very
high-risk projects);2 2 how some shareholders can exploit other share-
holders (e.g., by "freezing" them out, or by threatening to withdraw
their resources from the firm);23 and how shareholders can turn the
"agency cost" tables and take advantage of executives and other
corporate employees (e.g., by first leading them to believe their
hard work will be rewarded by future raises or job security, and then
24firing them). Such opportunistic shareholder behavior is sometimes
21 This Symposium, for example, contains numerous articles that focus primarily
on the problem of protecting shareholders from executive misbehavior: Jennifer Ar-
len & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 577 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152
U. PA. L. REv. 713 (2003); Lawrence Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and
Some Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 881 (2003);
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Provisions as
Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (2003); Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L.
Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
523 (2003).
22 See, e.g., Gulati et al., supra note 1, at 912 (noting that equity-holders have an
incentive to choose riskier projects, which increase the value of their claim and reduce
the value of the debtholders' claim); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors'Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1511 (1993)
("[C]orporate restructuring may impose greater risk of loss on bondholders and thus
transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders."); Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient
Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV.
214, 228 (1999) ("Investors who own much more of the firm's equity than its debt may
push managers to adopt inefficient strategies that increase the value of the firm stock
but decrease the value of the firm debt by more.").
23 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the 19th Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing
how incorporation can minimize the risk that a shareholder might try to withdraw her
investment to the detriment of other shareholders); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 296 (1986) (discussing
fiduciary duties and rights that help "minority shareholders protect themselves against
opportunistic behavior by the majority, [but also create] incentives for the minority to
behave opportunistically toward the majority to extract disproportionate concessions");
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets
and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24J. CORP. L. 913, 914-15 (1999) (outlin-
ing "several repeated scenarios that raise the issue of 'minority oppression"' by major-
ity shareholders); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders'Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196-97 (1988) (noting that majority interests can
manae the affairs of the corporation in ways that oppress the minority shareholders).
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case For Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 439-40 (claiming that
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described in terms of "shareholder oppression," "implied contracts,"
or even "bilateral agency costs." A number of recent writings, how-
ever, including my own and those of Margaret Blair and Lynn Lo-
• 25
Pucki, describe the problem as one of corporate team production.
other firm stakeholders "are exposed... to shareholder opportunism"); Charles R.
Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
155, 166 (1986) ("Where contracting between managers and shareholders is an impor-
tant source of discipline on manager behavior and where the best contract is implicit
with much compensation delayed until manager performance can be better evaluated,
managers may fear that a hostile tender offer will provide shareholders with an avenue
for opportunism."); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37-42 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988) (discussing the importance of trust between shareholders and
stakeholders so as to avoid exploitation).
25 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 418-22 (discussing the team production
analysis and directors' roles as mediating hierarchs); Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 250
("In the economic literature, team production problems are said to arise in situations
where a production activity requires the combined investment and coordinated effort
of two or more individuals or groups."); Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2004), available at
http://lawweb.usc.edu/faculty/workshops/documents/LoPucki.pdf (discussing how
team production has important implications for understanding bankruptcy law); Stout,
supra note 1, at 1195-99 (discussing the team production argument against share-
holder primacy); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The
Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845 (2002) ("Modern corporate
production... is a form of team production."); see also ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 26-29 (7th ed. 2001) (citing Blair & Stout's theory
that the corporation is a nexus of specific investments in team production); CHARLES
R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 7-9 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining the problems of organizing production as
an implicit team); Allen Kaufman et al., A Team Production Model of Corporate Gov-
ernance Revisited (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=410080 (discussing team pro-
duction in corporations); Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate
Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 668-69 (2002) ("IT]he new Team Production
Model [TPM] .... is a powerful economic model that helps shift the law away from an
overly narrow concern merely for shareholders. TPM is useful for a broader under-
standing of corporate social responsibility."); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2002) (dis-
cussing Blair & Stout's argument and stating that "the public corporation is best
viewed as a team of shareholders, creditors, workers, managers, and communities");
David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique of the Team Production
Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2000) (recounting Blair & Stout's
argument that, in understanding the "various participants in the corporation as a
team, [the team production model] describes the directors as independent 'mediating
hierarchs whose job it is to balance team members' competing interests'...." (quot-
ing Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 280-81)); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Pro-
duction in Post-Capitalist Society, 24J. CORP. L. 869, 871 (1999) (asserting that increased
trust can help solve the team production problem); D. Gordon Smith, Team Production
in Venture Capital Investing, 24J. CORP. L. 947, 960-962 (1999) (describing the moral
hazard problem in venture capital financed corporate teams); Eric Talley, Taking the
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Team production analysis of the public corporation begins with
the observation that it takes more than shareholders' money to make
a corporation. After all, a pile of money sitting alone does nothing:
creating a productive firm requires other investments as well. Execu-
tives must invest skill and creativity, employees must put in time and
effort, and local governments may offer tax breaks and specialized in-
frastructure. Moreover, shareholders are not the only financial inves-
tors in the firm; creditors often provide funding as well. Corporate
production accordingly is a form of team production involving the in-
26
puts of many team members. Many of these inputs may be essential
to the success of the enterprise.
How can shareholders induce nonshareholder groups to make
their essential contributions? One obvious inducement is a formal
contract that promises specific rewards in return for a specific contri-
bution. For example, a senior executive may work in part because she
has negotiated an explicit and legally enforceable compensation
package that includes wages, deferred compensation, insurance, and
other perquisites. Yet economic analysis of the team production prob-
lem teaches that in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information,
formal contracting can go only so far. This is especially true when
team members' contributions become "team-specific," meaning they
cannot be easily withdrawn from the team and sold for their full value
27elsewhere. In such cases, it can become impossible to draft formal
"I" Out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24J. CORP. L.
1001, 1002 (1999) ("In its most basic form, the team-production account spotlights the
observation that productive activities within many economic organizations require co-
ordinated, firm-specific investments from two or more participants."); cf Rock &
Wachter, supra note 23, at 919 (discussing the problem of shareholder oppression in
close corporations and inherent team production problems in terms of "match-specific
investments in a context with substantial asymmetry of information").
26 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 271-76 (modeling a typical team pro-
duction situation where each team member contributes to corporate output). Al-
though this Article focuses primarily on the corporate contributions of shareholders
and executive officers, other groups, such as creditors, rank-and-file employees, and
even governments, also can make essential contributions to corporate team production
in public firms. See id. at 250, 278 (noting the various groups that can contribute to
team production); see also Stout, supra note 1, at 1195 ("[C]reditors, employees, man-
agers, and even local governments often must make contributions in order for an en-
terprise to succeed.").
27 See infra pp. 681-82 (discussing the concept of team-specific resources); see also
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 7-9 (explaining team-specific investment and
the problems that result).
[Vol. 152: 667
THE SHAREHOII)ER AS ULYSSES
contracts that protect corporate team members from each other's op-
28
portunism.
To gain a quick sense of how difficult contracting over team pro-
duction can be, consider the problems involved in drafting a simple
contract between two individuals to move a large sofa. Moving a sofa
is a classic example of team production; it takes two to do the job, and
each mover's effort is essential. Yet if the movers agree ex ante to
share their profits according to a fixed formula, each will have an in-
centive to shirk, in the hopes of leaving the other to carry more than
her share of the load. This is because each mover gets all of the bene-
fits from shirking, but bears only part of the cost. Conversely, if the
movers agree to wait until after the job is done to split the profits ac-
cording to who worked hardest, their investment in the job becomes
team-specific: neither can recover the value of her effort except by
sharing in the team's profits. As a result, each mover now has the in-
centive to "rent seek" by claiming more than her fair share because
each knows the other is vulnerable and cannot now withdraw her ef-
forts.
Ex ante formal contracting would be much easier if the movers
could employ a machine that measures exactly how much effort each
person expends. However, such devices do not exist, even for the
straightforward task of moving furniture. The ex ante contracting
problem becomes far more intractable when we are trying to measure
exactly the efforts that go into the far more complex task of building a
successful business.
Consider the example of a start-up corporate team formed by two
individuals: an investor who contributes cash and a professional man-
ager who provides ideas, expertise, and time. As in the sofa-moving
example, each team member's contribution swiftly becomes, at least
in part, team-specific. After the investor's money has been used to
purchase specialized equipment and pay salaries, she cannot recover
the full value of those funds except by waiting to see if the venture
is successful. Similarly, after the manager has expended time and
effort, or acquired firm-specific human capital (knowledge, skills, and
contacts that are uniquely valuable to the firm and cannot be sold
elsewhere), she cannot earn a return from those investments except
by waiting until the venture begins to produce profits.
28See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 265-69 (discussing contracting prob-
lems).
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As this example illustrates, team production often requires team
members to contribute assets that, once committed to team produc-
tion, cannot be withdrawn and sold elsewhere for their full value. In
economic parlance, the contributions become team-specific.m Firm-
specific human capital is one classic example of a team-specific re-
source. The concept of team specific investment is much broader,
however, and also encompasses past investments of time and effort
made in the expectation of future rewards. 3 Thus "team-specific in-
vestment" and "sunk-cost investment" are used as synonyms in this Ar-
ticle.
Having made specific investments, each team member now finds
herself vulnerable to the other's opportunism in ways that formal con-
tracting can do little to eliminate. For example, suppose that the
manager, eager to ensure a return on her sunk-cost investments of
time and skill, demands a contract that entitles her for some period to
a salary, some percentage of the venture's profits, and a generous sev-
erance package (or "golden parachute"). The investor will rightly
worry that this arrangement creates incentives for the manager to
shirk-she gets only part of the returns from working hard, but all of
the returns from shirking (not to mention the tempting opportunity
to be paid for not working if the parachute is deployed). Conversely,
suppose the investor, to prevent shirking, demands a contract that
provides the manager will be paid in proportion to her efforts and in-
vestments, will have no golden parachute, and can be fired at any time
for cause. The manager will rightly worry that, after she has made her
sunk-cost investments, the investor might try to deny her a just share
of the resulting profits by claiming she did not use her best efforts, or
perhaps even try to fire her for cause.
As an alternative, the parties can try to tie the manager's salary
to some "objective" measure of performance, such as share price.
Yet, in the common situation where performance is not perfectly
29 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organiza-
tions: An Introduction, 24J. CORP. L. 743 (1999) ("[Slome of the resources the team
members must invest to produce are 'team-specific,' meaning they have a significantly
higher value when used in the team than in their next best use."); Charles R. O'Kelley,
Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L.
REv. 216, 222 (1992) (describing a team-specific contribution as "an asset... [with]
value that cannot be realized by putting the asset to another use"); see also Vincent P.
Crawford, Relationship-Specific Investment, 105 Q.J. ECON. 561, 566 (defining a "sunk-cost
investment" as an asset "that cannot be withdrawn[,]" consumed, or reinvested else-
where).
30 See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 272-76 (discussing the various types of invest-
ments that are team-specific).
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observable-remember the sofa-movers-a truly accurate and objec-
tive performance signal will not exist. As a result, contracts based on
signals are not only difficult and expensive to negotiate and draft, but
are also inflexible, unresponsive to unanticipated changes in circum-
stances, and create their own opportunities for rent-seeking.' Sup-
pose, for example, the firm's share price drops after a competitor
enters the market. The investor can claim opportunistically that the
loss was due to the manager's bungling. In the same vein, the man-
ager can argue that she deserves a raise because only her extraordi-
nary efforts kept the stock price from dropping even further.
Team production analysis accordingly teaches that it is not only
possible for corporate executives to opportunistically impose "agency
costs" on shareholders-it is also possible for shareholders to oppor-
tunistically impose "agency costs" on executives and other nonshare-
holder groups that make sunk-cost investments in the corporate team.
To observers accustomed to focusing on the myriad ways in which
corporate executives can take advantage of rationally apathetic share-
holders, the observation that the exploitation can run in the opposite
direction may seem counterintuitive. Nevertheless, this "man bites
dog" scenario is not only theoretically possible, but quite plausible in
the business world.
To understand why, consider again the example of the start-up
venture organized by the investor and the manager. Assume the par-
ties initially agree that if the manager does a good job and things go
well, the investor will reward her with future job security, raises, and
perks. (This sort of understanding is common in many employment
relationships.) Five years later, the business is successful, with annual
sales of $110,000. At this point, the manager is being paid compensa-
tion and benefits that total $100,000 annually. Assume that only ten
percent of this amount reflects extracontractual returns on the man-
ager's extracontractual sunk-cost investments; the manager could earn
$90,000 if she abandoned her investment in the team and sought em-
ployment elsewhere. Finally, assume for simplicity that the manager's
compensation and benefits are the firm's only expenses.
Now suppose the investor decides to opportunistically claim that
the manager's performance is subpar, a claim that the manager
would find expensive and difficult to contest in court. At this point,
the investor could lower the manager's annual compensation to
$90,001 and still keep her in the firm. This ten percent reduction in
31 Id. at 271-74 & nn.49-58.
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the manager's returns would allow the investor to nearly double her
annual profits, from $10,000 to almost $20,000.32
This example demonstrates how shareholders can face tempting
opportunities for rent-seeking in any firm where payments to non-
shareholders are large relative to net profits (a common business sce-
nario) and even a modest percentage of those expenses reflect
extracontractual payments for sunk-cost investments (also a common
pattern).33 Recognizing this threat, stakeholders might be justifiably
reluctant to make extracontractual specific investments in a public
firm where shareholders enjoy unalloyed control. For similar reasons,
shareholders might be reluctant to invest in a firm where stakeholders
(e.g., executives) hold all the power. The end result is that investment
may not occur at all, and the firm may never come into being.
Team production analysis consequently casts a spotlight on the of-
ten-overlooked problem of how we can induce the various constituen-
cies of a public corporation to make specific investments that can-
not be protected by contract or other solutions.34 In a series of recent
articles written by Margaret Blair and myself,35 we have explored the
idea that boards of directors-in addition to any advantages they offer
shareholders in public firms by monitoring executives-may also play
32 Alternatively, the investor might sell the firm to a hostile bidder who intends to
replace the manager or to reduce her compensation and benefits. In the above hypo-
thetical, such a bidder would be willing to pay up to a one hundred percent premium
for control over the firm. This is a considerably larger premium than actually paid in
most hostile acquisitions. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 926 tbl.2
(2002) (finding a thirty-seven percent average premium in hostile deals in a recent
five-year sample). A corollary is that all or part of the premiums paid in some hostile
takeovers may reflect wealth transfers from employees and managers to stockholders.
See Stout, supra note 25, at 853.
33 This example is based on a similar one presented in Shleifer & Summers, supra
note 24, at 36.
34 Formal contracting is not the only possible solution to this investment problem.
In small firms, for example, or those with a controlling shareholder, investors and pro-
fessional managers may often interact face-to-face and rely on interpersonal trust and
trustworthiness to discourage opportunism. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1735, 1799-1807 (2001) (exploring the role of trust in private firms). Market forces,
including concern for business reputation, can also police against exploitative behavior
among team members in some situations, such as when venture capitalists act as "re-
peat players" in the market for start-up firms. See D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital
Contracting in the Information Age, 2J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 157 (1998) (ex-
amining the "market for reputation").
35 Blair, supra note 23; Blair & Stout, supra note 1; Blair & Stout, supra note 29;
Blair & Stout, supra note 3; Stout, supra note 1; Stout, supra note 25.
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an essential role in addressing this problem. This argument is sum-
marized below.
As previously discussed, corporate production often requires a
number of groups besides shareholders to make sunk-cost investments
that cannot be adequately protected by formal contract or market
mechanisms. As a result, a number of groups in addition to share-
holders are potential "residual claimants" or "residual risk-bearers" in
the firm. These nonshareholder groups recognize that if the share-
holders were given unalloyed control of the firm, they would not nec-
essarily use that control to maximize profits for all team members.
Instead, shareholders might extract wealth from other team members
by threatening to destroy or expropriate their specific investments.
Similarly, if managers or creditors were given complete control, they
might also engage in rent-seeking.
To address this problem of mutual opportunism, corporate team
members prefer to cede control over both the firm and their sunk-
cost, team-specific investments to an outside party that is not itself a
residual claimant and thus lacks any direct incentive to take advantage
of team members. This outside party is the board of directors. Direc-
tors, in their positions as directors, are not entitled to dividends, in-
terest payments, or salaries.3 6 By tradition, they receive only a flat fee
for their services, and a relatively modest one at that (although it may
not seem modest to underpaid academics).37 Thus directors-unlike
36 Individuals who sit on corporate boards may receive significant dividends, in-
terest payments, or salaries if, in addition to their board positions, they also own a
large number of shares, hold substantial corporate debt, or are employed by the firm.
In such a case, a director may be tempted to rent-seek by using her power as a director
to further her interest as a shareholder, creditor, or employee. To some extent, the
duty of loyalty polices against such behavior. See infta note 38. To the extent that it
does not, the director's ability to act as a disinterested mediator is reduced. This may
explain why, as of the late 1990s, seventy percent of large firms chose to have boards
with a majority of "independent" directors who were not also employees of the firm.
John C. Coates V, Measuring the Domain of the Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 844-45 (1999). It also raises questions
about the wisdom of compensating directors with stock or stock options, a practice that
has become common at many companies in recent years. By making directors large
shareholders, this practice may also make boards less likely to resist opportunistic
shareholder attempts to extract wealth from other corporate constituencies, thereby
discouraging these constituencies' extracontractual investments.
37 See CLARK, supra note 8, at 108-09 ("[D]irectors typically receive a flat yearly fee
that is unrelated to their performance on behalf of the shareholders."); Lynn A. Stout,
On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2003) (observing that direc-
tors' fees normally can be measured in tens of thousands of dollars, which is not a
large amount to a successful businessperson).
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shareholders, creditors, executives, or employees-have relatively little
opportunity or incentive to use their corporate positions to enrich
themselves at other corporate participants' expense.38
Corporate law accordingly gives the board-and not the share-
holders or the CEO-ultimate control over the corporation's assets.
Similarly, corporate law gives the board discretion to allocate the re-
turns generated by corporate assets among various team members.
Shareholders and nonshareholders alike prefer this arrangement. By
making the directors the "mediating hierarchs" of the firm, they tie
their own hands, reducing their ability to take advantage of each
other. The end result is to encourage the sorts of committed invest-
ments that cannot be protected fully by formal contract, yet may be
essential to business success.
It is important to note that directors can fulfill this hands-tying
function without consciously intending to act as mediators among
the firm's various constituencies. Of course, many directors do view
themselves as mediators trying to balance shareholders' interests
against those of creditors, employees, and the like.39  Nevertheless,
directors do not have to think of themselves this way to perform a
mediating function. Board governance by its very nature makes it
more awkward and difficult for any of the constituencies of a public
company to withdraw resources from the firm. Shareholders who
want a dividend, executives who want their options repriced, and
creditors who want their debt restructured must all go before the
38 Because of the protection directors enjoy from the business judgment rule in
cases that do not involve a direct conflict between the director's personal economic
interests and those of the firm, the principal constraint on directors is the duty of loy-
alty, which prevents directors from using their corporate positions to increase their
own wealth. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 298-99 (discussing the duty of loyalty).
Duty of loyalty rules perform an essential function under the mediating model by en-
suring that directors are not residual claimants of the firm. Id. A corollary of this view
is that governance arrangements that make directors residual claimants-e.g., rules
that compensate directors primarily in stock or rules that allow inside directors to en-
ter interested transactions with the firm-undermine the mediating role and invite
intrateam rent-seeking. See supra note 36.
39 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(noting that directors may act out of concern for other constituencies, including em-
ployees and the community, in their decision making); Credit Lyonnais Bank Neder-
land, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at
*108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("[D]irectors will recognize that... circumstances
may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the cor-
poration may diverge form the choice that the shareholders (or the creditors, or the
employees, or any other single group interested in the litigation) would make."), affd
sub nom. Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
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board to make a case requesting such action. This need to offer ajus-
tification, alone, can discourage more blatant attempts at rent-
seeking, and even a well-reasoned request may be turned down by the
board. Thus, board governance increases the cost and risk associated
with intrateam rent-seeking, discouraging ex post opportunism and
encouraging ex ante investment in team production.
The mediating model of the board, like the monitoring model,
accordingly does not view directors as superior corporate decision
makers for all the firm's decisions, but only for an important subset of
decisions: those that involve a conflict between corporate constituen-
cies that the constituents themselves have been unable to negotiate
and have instead opted to kick "upstairs" (at some risk to both sides)
for the board's resolution.4° Like the monitoring model, the mediat-
ing model leaves day-to-day operations and most business strategizing
largely to company executives.
Unlike the monitoring model, however, the mediating model
does not confine the directors' role only to limiting how much wealth
the firms' executives extract from the firm. Directors also limit how
much wealth is distributed to the firm's shareholders, creditors, and
even to the local community. Thus the board not only has the ulti-
mate say in hiring and compensating executives-it also has the ulti-
mate say in whether the firm will pay dividends, recapitalize in a
fashion that helps debtholders, or pursue or abandon a merger or an
asset sale that might harm employees and the local community.
The mediating model of the board accordingly differs from the
monitoring model in that it does not view directors only as fiduciaries
of shareholders. Directors are also fiduciaries of the firm itself, an en-
tity that can be understood as a nexus of firm-specific commitments
made by investors, managers, and other corporate constituencies.
41
Thus, where the monitoring model casts suspicion on any board deci-
sion to use firm assets to provide extracontractual benefits to non-
shareholders (e.g., by providing employees with better health care
coverage or by making donations to local charities), the mediating
model takes a benign view of such discretionary, extracontractual
40 As a practical matter, it can be expected that many potential conflicts among
corporate team members will never be put before the board for resolution because the
team members involved, recognizing that they are acting in the shadow of the board,
work out compromises among themselves. For example, faced with unrest among
rank-and-file employees, executives may voluntarily increase employee wages while re-
fraining from asking for large bonuses for themselves.
41 See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 285-86 (discussing the corporation as the
nexus of firm-specific investments).
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expenditures. Far from being evidence of malfeasance or "managerial
slack," director largesse toward nonshareholders is the natural and an-
ticipated outcome of governance by a mediating board. Similarly, ex-
tracontractual payments to managers or employees are not inefficient
"private benefits" or "agency costs" to be eliminated, but evidence of
efficient, surplus-producing team production.
The benefits that director governance provides in terms of en-
couraging team-specific investment are not, of course, costless. It is
important to recognize that the mediating model of board govern-
ance does not assume or require that directors have a particularly ro-
bust incentive to maximize returns on the firm's investments once
they have been made. (This lack of incentive can be disturbing to
those who favor the monitoring model on the theory that sharehold-
ers, whom the monitoring model inaccurately depicts as the firm's
sole residual claimants, have such an incentive.) The mediating
model simply assumes that directors want to get, and keep, their posi-
tions as directors. Thus, directors have incentive to help bring the
public firm into existence and to encourage corporate constituencies
to make specific investments. Having accomplished this, the board
also has an incentive not to let the firm fall apart. As a result, the
board will want to ensure that each essential team member receives
enough of a return on its investment to induce it to remain on the
team instead of seeking outside opportunities. Beyond this minimum
standard, however, the board does not have a particularly strong mo-
tive to maximize returns to shareholders, managers, or other residual
claimants. Although directors probably want their firms to grow in
order to expand their own "empires," they do not have an especially
keen drive to maximize returns on firm assets.
The mediating model thus predicts that after firms are created, we
can expect boards to run them in a satisficing, but suboptimal, fash-
ion. The result is an "agency cost" borne not just by shareholders,
but by all the investing members of the corporate team. As a result, a
mediating board is clearly only a second-best solution to the problem
of encouraging sunk-cost investment in corporate production.42
Yet it is important to recognize that the monitoring board is also
only a second-best solution to the problem of executive-imposed
agency costs. A board that serves only the shareholders' interests
would not seek to maximize returns on all the firm's investments
any more than a mediating board would. Instead, it would seek to
42 See id. at 283-84 (discussing the mediating board as a second-best solution).
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maximize only returns to shareholders-sometimes by expropriating
wealth from other team members. The result may be to discourage
nonshareholders from making extracontractual contributions. For
example, consider how a firm's executives, employees, and creditors
would likely behave if they believed the firm's shareholders could, at
any time, require the board to withhold all extracontractual benefits
from these groups and instead pay out every penny of excess return to
the shareholders. Would they put in the extra hours, extra effort, and
extra patience in hard times that make a business succeed?
Investors who are deciding between investing in a firm governed
by a mediating board and investing in a firm governed by a purely
monitoring board accordingly find their choice boils down to the
question: Which is more important to business success? The ex ante
advantage of getting corporate constituents to make extracontractual
specific investments in the firm in the first place? Or, the ex post ad-
vantage of optimizing shareholders' subsequent returns from that
firm without these investments? To paraphrase Winston Churchill,
the mediating board may be the worst possible form of public corpo-
ration governance-except for the alternatives.
H. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As noted in Part I, most contemporary corporate scholars sub-
scribe to the monitoring model of board function, which confines di-
rector decision making primarily to overseeing the firm's executive
officers. This model, however, does not adequately explain the ex-
treme separation of share ownership and firm control that we observe
in public companies. That separation seems more consistent with the
mediating model, which views directors as decision makers not only
with regard to the distribution of corporate wealth to managers, but
also with regard to the distribution of corporate wealth to sharehold-
ers, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders.
Despite the intellectual dominance of the monitoring model in
contemporary scholarship, both models claim a long and respectable
lineage. The argument that boards ought to act as faithful agents of
shareholders can be traced back at least to a 1931 article by Adolph
Berle in the Harvard Law Review.43 Similarly, while the emerging lit-
erature on team production offers new and useful insights into how
43 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1049 (1931) (arguing that corporations' powers should be used "only for the ratable
benefit of all the shareholders").
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director control can benefit shareholders by promoting other
stakeholders' ex ante team-specific investment,44 variations on the me-
diating model can be found in the scholarly literature dating back at
least to the 1980s, 45 and the general idea that directors should be freeS 46
to take account of stakeholders' interests appears much earlier. In-
deed, in the Harvard Law Review issue that followed the publication of
Berle's shareholder primacy thesis, Professor Merrick Dodd argued
that directors should seek to advance the interests not only of share-
holders, but of employees, managers, and the community as well.
47
As this long tradition of disagreement suggests, one cannot reject
either the monitoring board hypothesis or the mediating board
hypothesis at the theoretical level. Both models are intellectually
sound and internally consistent. This may explain why the "Great
Debate," as it was recently characterized by Delaware Vice Chancellors
Leo Strine and Jack Jacobs and former Chancellor Bill Allen,48
44 Team production analysis can help, for example, shed light on the nature of
the firm, see Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 271-76 (describing the firm as a nexus of
firm-specific commitments that are not protected by contract or otherwise); the terms
of the "implied contract" entered into between and among team members, id. at 277-
78 (viewing contract as a pact to participate in a process of mutual goal-setting and
dispute resolution under the ultimate authority of a board); and the rationale for a
variety of otherwise-puzzling corporate law doctrines, id. at 290-315 (describing how
team production analysis helps explain rules of legal personality, fiduciary duty, and
shareholder voting).
45 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 24, at 448 ("[T]he parties to the implicit contract
need an independent body to serve as, in effect, an arbitration panel to preserve the
fair expectations of each side."); Knoeber, supra note 24, at 157-66 (arguing that im-
plicit contracting between managers and shareholders for golden parachutes and
shark repellents is advantageous to both parties); Shleifer & Summers, supra note 24,
at 41-42 (arguing that takeovers breach implicit contracts between shareholders and
managers, potentially discouraging the latter's specific investments in the firm); see also
EISENBERG, supra note 11, at 159-62 (discussing the board's potential role as "modality"
for shareholder and nonshareholder groups to influence managers' decisions).
46 See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 356 ("It is conceivable []-indeed it
seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive[l-that the 'control' of the
great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a vari-
ety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of
the income stream....").
47 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 1145, 1148 (1932) ("[P]ublic opinion.., has made and is today making substan-
tial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic insti-
tution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function .... ).
48 See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067, 1067 (2002) ("We begin a new century with
a debate that is old but persistent.... [T]he question is whether corporation law exists
solely in order to facilitate shareholder economic welfare or whether ... [it] represents
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between those who believe directors should serve only shareholders
and those who believe directors should have discretion to serve
stakeholder groups as well, continues to be unresolved. Nevertheless,
while the mediating model enjoys substantial support among those
who actually participate in or advise the business community, the
monitoring model is more widely accepted among academics today. 9
Many, if not most, contemporary corporate law casebooks and schol-
arly articles implicitly or explicitly subscribe to the notion that the
principal job of the board is to protect shareholders by limiting the
"agency costs" executives would impose.50
Why does the purely monitoring model dominate over the medi-
ating model in academic circles? The reason seems to lie in a com-
mon perception that a mediating board, while possible in theory, is
implausible in practice. For example, theorists have argued that, as a
practical matter, firm-specific investment is not important to corpo-
rate production; that nonshareholder groups, as a practical matter,
can protect their investments adequately through formal contracts;
and that the mediating model is unworkable because, as a practical
matter, directors cannot be expected to do a good job of looking out
for the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. 5'
a partial commitment by the law to values in addition to implementing shareholder
will.").
49 For example, as John Coates has observed, academics tend to disapprove of an-
titakeover defenses as contributing to the problem of agency costs, while businesspeo-
pie and regulators generally support them. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in
the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 273 (2000)
("[A]cademics generally have taken a dim view of takeover defenses, and practicing
lawyers have generally supported defenses in advising clients, with judges and legisla-
tors siding more with practitioners than with academics.").
See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 248 n.1 (citing "voluminous" literature adopt-
ing the monitoring model). It should be noted, however, that, while the monitoring
model is more widely accepted among academics, there is no shortage of scholars to
argue that directors should be willing and able to serve a wide range of corporate con-
stituencies. See id. at 253 n.16 (citing works that adopt the "stakeholder" approach); see
also supra note 25 (citing casebooks and articles that discuss team production).
See, eg, EISENBERG, supra note 11, at 162 (concluding on the basis of empirical
speculations that "[o]n balance, therefore, the importance of the board's modality
function... is questionable as to clients and social groups"); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 973, 1022-26 (2002)
(arguing against the mediating board on the assumption that directors cannot do a
good job of looking after the interests of nonshareholders); Michael Klausner, Institu-
tional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L.
REv. 755, 782-84 (2003) (rejecting the team production explanation of anti-
takeover defenses as efficient supports for director primacy as a theoretical possibility
that, in the author's view, based on empirical speculations, seems "doubtful");
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment
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These arguments cannot be rejected a priori. Nevertheless, their
strength ultimately depends on factual assumptions about the nature
of the business world. Critiques of the mediating model accordingly
can be reduced to empirical claims that, for a variety of reasons, even
if a mediating board can add value to a firm in theory, it is unlikely to
do so in practice. Such claims can be tested. Put differently, the long-
standing debate between proponents of the monitoring model of the
board and proponents of the mediating model is an empirical argu-
ment that can only be resolved satisfactorily by empirical inquiry-not
by armchair speculation. To choose between the two models, one
needs evidence.
This Part examines some of that evidence. Empirical observation
strongly suggests that the mediating model of the board provides a
better positive description of the way corporate law actually works
than the dominant monitoring model. This strength is especially ap-
parent in the area of corporate law that is the subject of this Sympo-
sium--change of control transactions.
A. The Empirical Case for the Mediating Model as a
Positive Description of Board Function
In evaluating the relative empirical strength of the monitoring
model versus the mediating model, it is useful to begin by asking
which model does a better job of describing how board governance
actually works in modern firms. After all, it is standard practice for
economists to judge the value of models primarily by their ability to
predict observed phenomena. One of the most significant phenom-
ena observed in public corporations is a dramatic separation between
share ownership and control over corporate assets. Any model of the
public corporation that fails to predict this fundamental characteristic
is deeply flawed. 2
When this basic criterion-the ability to predict the separation of
ownership from control-is applied to the mediating and monitoring
models of board function, the mediating model seems, on first inspec-
tion, to be far superior.53 After all, the monitoring model predicts that
of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. 173, 188-92 (arguing that, as an em-
pirical matter, nonshareholders can protect themselves through contracts).
52 See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 4-5 (arguing that a primary criterion for evalu-
ating any model of the corporation should be the model's ability to predict the separa-
tion of share ownership from control).
5 See Allen et al., supra note 48, at 1079 ("Delaware law inclines toward the entity
[mediating board] model. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that... Delaware law af-
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directors should act as shareholders' agents. This idea implies both
that boards ought to run firms solely in shareholders' interests, and
that when boards fail to do this, shareholders collectively ought to be
able to intervene and make boards dance to their tune. The default
rules of corporate law clearly do not follow this prediction. To the
contrary, as long as directors do not use their powers to line their own
pockets, 54 they enjoy legal discretion to run the firm pretty much as
they please, including discretion to pursue corporate strategies that
benefit nonshareholder groups at the shareholders' expense and over
the shareholders' clear and unanimous objections. Thus directors le-
gally can refuse to pay dividends; can reprice executives' options; can
retroactively increase retirees' pensions; can shift to expensive but
"socially responsible" production methods; and can even donate cor-
porate funds to charity. If a firm's shareholders pass a unanimous
resolution requesting a board to stop doing such things, the board is
free to ignore it.'5 If the shareholders bring suit, the directors are pro-
tected by the business judgment rule. 6 And, as Berle and Means fa-
mously pointed out, if the shareholders try to vote the directors out of
office, they likely will be defeated by their own rational apathy."
The end result is that directors of public firms enjoy, as a legal
and practical matter, an extremely wide range of autonomy to sacri-
fice shareholders' interests in order to serve other corporate
stakeholders. That range is not unlimited, but it is far too broad to be
consistent with the monitoring model's prediction that directors are
shareholders' "agents."58  Given this obvious contradiction, it seems
fords the directors room to consider the interests of other constituencies .... "); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of Control
Transactions: Is There Any "There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2002) (noting
that outside the context of the Revlon case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the mediating model prevails in corporate law).
54 See supra note 38 (discussing the duty of loyalty).
55 See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 290-91 (discussing directors' authority to ig-
nore shareholders' resolutions).
56 See id. at 299-305 (discussing the business judgment rule).
57 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 80-82 (discussing obstacles to collective
shareholder action).
58 It might be argued that, even if corporate law permits directors to sacrifice
shareholders' interests in order to serve those of other constituencies, market pres-
sures, including the pressures of the product market, the capital market, and the mar-
ket for corporate control, force directors to steer in the direction of shareholder
primacy. A moment's thought reveals that this is not necessarily the case for the prod-
uct market: director concern for consumers is hardly likely to make it more difficult
for a firm to sell its products. Similarly, the possibility that directors might favor credi-
tors can only enhance a firm's ability to issue debt, which is a more important source
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curious that more scholars have not questioned the descriptive validity
of the monitoring model.
Two possible explanations come to mind for why the conflict be-
tween observed corporate governance patterns and the notion that
directors work only for shareholders often goes unremarked. The
first explanation hinges on the observation that, in many situations
where boards sacrifice shareholders' returns to provide benefits to
nonshareholders, such actions can be rationalized, however implausi-
bly, as serving shareholders' long-run interests.59 For example, a deci-
sion to retroactively increase retirees' pensions can be defended as
contributing to higher employee morale that in turn increases pro-
ductivity, and a decision to donate corporate funds to local charities
can be defended as a purchase of valuable community goodwill. Thus
in many cases where boards use their control over corporate assets to
provide benefits to nonshareholder groups beyond those required by
contract, it remains possible to dispute, or at least to gloss over, the
extent to which this pattern undermines the empirical validity of the
purely monitoring model.
There is a second, and arguably more significant, reason why the
discrepancies between the predictions of the monitoring theory and
the realities of modern corporate governance are often overlooked.
This is the common belief that, even if the law does not require direc-
tors to maximize shareholders' returns, market forces--especially the
market for corporate control-may do so. This belief can be traced
back to the development and refinement during the 1970s and 1980s
of the hostile tender offer as a vehicle for allowing hostile acquirers to
do an "end run" around the boards of target firms by assembling a
controlling block of shares from the target's widely dispersed
shareholders and then using this newly created control block to
displace the board. The result, many argued, was an active "market
for corporate control" that would swiftly punish any board that failed
to keep its stock price high and its shareholders happy.
6
0
of capital for seasoned firms than equity. And while in theory an active market for
corporate control pressures directors to favor shareholders' interests, in practice hos-
tile takeovers do not pose much of a threat to incumbent boards. See infta text accom-
panying notes 60-69 (discussing limits on the market for control).
59 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55
(Del. 1989) (allowing the directors of Time to reject a hostile offer at a very large pre-
mium on the grounds that the shareholders' "long-term goals" would be better served
by merging Time with another company favored by Time's board).
60 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1169 (1981) ("The
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It is vital to note, however, that hostile tender offers only became
common in the 1970s and early 19 80s as a result of structural and cul-
tural changes in the investment banking industry that made financing
hostile bids feasible. Before these changes, hostile acquisitions were
unusual and unlikely.6 Additionally, it took only a few years for busi-
nesses to counter the emerging takeover threat by developing an im-
pressive array of defensive tactics that would-be targets could use to
fend off unwanted suitors. By the mid-1980s, for example, it had be-
come common practice for directors of potential targets to shield
themselves from the threat of a hostile bid by deploying the newly
created antitakeover defense known as the "poison pill. ' '62 Similarly,
when hostile bidders turned to proxy battles to oust recalcitrant
boards, directors at many established firms and a majority of new
firms quickly responded by adopting "classified board" provisions. 63
Accordingly, an active market for corporate control existed, to the
extent it did so at all, during only a fraction of. the time the public
corporation has been the dominant form of business in the United
States. Today, incumbent directors of public companies have every
opportunity-through poison pills, staggered board provisions, and
other defenses, including incorporating in states with antitakeover
statutes-to insulate themselves from all but the most persistent,
wealthy, and lucky suitors. Nevertheless, memories of the 1970s
and 1980s linger. With them perhaps lingers the perception that the
dynamic takeover market of the 1970s and early 1980s was somehow
"normal," while the relative security incumbent boards enjoy today is
the aberration. From a historical perspective, the reverse is true.
This last observation points to an important irony-it is the
change of control context that, in many ways, provides the strongest
evidence for the descriptive accuracy of the mediating board model.
Consider the example of a hostile acquirer that wants to buy all of a
tender bidding process polices managers... and disciplines or replaces them if they
stray too far from the service of the shareholders."); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV.
819, 841-42 (1981) (discussing the shareholders' option to sell depressed stock to new
owners, who would then replace the ineffective management team).
61 See generally Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037, 1039-50 (2002) (describing the rise of the hostile tender offer in the 1970s and
the development of the poison pill and various antitakeover rules in the 1980s in re-
sponse).
62 See id. at 1044 (noting the "increasing use of the pill in 1984-85").
63 See infra text accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing the rise of staggered board
provisions and their role in preventing hostile takeovers).
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target firm's outstanding shares in a cash merger at a fifty percent
premium over market price. Suppose the target's shareholders en-
thusiastically and unanimously support the merger, while the firm's
executive and employees oppose it. Most commentators believe that,
under Delaware law, the board is free to favor the employees' desires
over those of the shareholders by 'just saying no" and refusing to sell
the firm.64 Moreover, it is clear that the board can protect the execu-
tives and employees by seeking out a friendly merger with a public
65firm, even if this means the shareholders will receive a lower price.
Only if the directors make the obvious and avoidable mistake of seek-
ing refuge in the arms of a private company (thus putting the target
into so-called "Revlon mode") is a court likely to intrude on the
board's authority, and possibly oblige it to favor the shareholders by
66selling the firm to the highest bidder.
Change of control transactions consequently provide some of the
best illustrations of the remarkable degree of discretion corporate law
grants directors to favor nonshareholder interests at the shareholders'
expense. They also highlight how easily boards can insulate them-
selves from the supposed pressures of the "market for corporate con-
trol." Finally, change of control transactions draw attention to the
64 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 32, at 906 (claiming that Delaware case law gives
directors the right to 'Just say no" to a hostile bid); Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses
Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 819, 820-22 (2002) (noting that di-
rectors can 'just say no" by refusing to redeem the company's poison pill); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Professorial Bear Hug: The ESB Proposal as a Conscious Effort to Make the
Delaware Courts Confront the Basic "Just Say No" Question, 55 STAN. L. REv. 863, 876
(2002) (emphasizing that poison pills allow directors to reject bids, but that share-
holders retain the power to remove the board through a proxy fight).
65 See Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad, supra note 1, at 1203-04 (noting that directors can
avoid Revlon duties by seeking a stock-for-stock exchange with another public firm).
66 See id. (arguing that directors are only obliged to seek the highest price for
shareholders if they are accepting a deal that would take a public company private); see
also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182, 185 (Del.
1986) (holding that when the directors of a public company decide to sell to a com-
pany with a controlling shareholder, effectively turning a public company into a pri-
vate one, the board has a duty to maximize shareholder wealth by getting the best
possible price for the firm's shares).
Revlon describes the one context where Delaware law appears to abandon director
primacy for shareholder primacy. Stout, supra note 1, at 1203-04. Subsequent cases
have drastically diminished Revlon's importance by holding that if directors decide not
to sell, or if they pursue a stock-for-stock merger with another public firm, Revlon is
inapplicable. Id.; see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1990) (holding that Revlon duties were not implicated in a stock-for-stock
exchange). As a result, directors can avoid falling into Revlon mode when they wish.
Stout, supra note 1, at 1204.
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weakness of arguments based on shareholders' "long-run" interests. It
is hard to claim with a straight face that a particular firm's sharehold-
ers will be better off in the long run if they are denied the chance to
sell their shares at a hefty premium, especially when those sharehold-
67ers eagerly wish to become ex-shareholders. To advance such an ar-
gument, one must claim both that the shareholders are
underestimating the value of their holdings by an amount greater.
than the premium (fifty percent or more in many cases) and that the
firm's directors for some reason cannot possibly persuade the share-
holders of their own foolishness.6" Arguments for director primacy
based on shareholders' long-run interests accordingly tend to lose, in
the takeover context, whatever traction they may enjoy in other situa-
tions.
It is accordingly extremely difficult to defend the descriptive accu-
racy of the monitoring model of board function in the change of con-
trol context. A corollary of this observation is that commentators who
favor the monitoring model of the board often argue that when it
comes to control transactions, the default rules of corporate law are
defective and need to be reformed. Thus, corporate theorists who
adhere to the monitoring model shift from arguing that the model is
an accurate positive description of how public corporations actually
are governed to arguing that the monitoring model provides an attrac-
tive normative template for how public corporations ought to be gov-
erned. The result is a vast (and still-growing) body of literature cri-
tiquing the many and varied aspects of corporate law that insulate
directors of public firms from an active "market for corporate con-
trol. " "
67 This is not to say that allowing boards to reject a premium bid might not serve
the long-run interests of shareholders as a class, nor that such director discretion might
not also serve the ex ante interests of the shareholders of the particular firm being tar-
geted. Indeed, this is the basic idea underlying the mediating model. See supra text
accompanying notes 33-38.
68 See Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 997-1007 (arguing that despite their informa-
tional disadvantage, shareholders, not boards, should have the final decision as to
whether the share price offered is sufficient). But see Kihlstrom & Wachter, supra note
21, at 574 (reasoning that allowing shareholders to determine the sufficiency of an of-
fer price increases overall agency costs).
69 A large body of literature implicitly adopts the monitoring model and argues
that antitakeover defenses increase agency costs by impeding the market for corporate
control. Recent examples include Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 975; Bebchuk et al., su-
pra note 32, at 950-51; Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward A New Theoy
of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REv. 261, 326
(2001). Earlier arguments in this vein can be found in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
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This shift from a positive to a normative perspective raises its own
empirical difficulties for the monitoring model, however. In particu-
lar, the claim that investors would prefer a purely monitoring board to
a mediating board is seriously undermined by several recent studies of
firm behavior in selecting charter provisions before an IPO.
B. The Empirical Case for the Mediating Board
as a Normative Prescription
As noted earlier, many modem corporate codes generally treat di-
rector governance as a default rule.70  Most significantly, section
141 (a) of the Delaware Code, while providing for board governance,
allows this pattern to be modified in the certificate of incorporation."
Similarly, section 102(b) (1) authorizes incorporators to include in a
corporate charter "[a]ny provision for the management of the busi-
ness and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any pro-
vision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders."
72
Delaware corporate law accordingly authorizes incorporators to
adopt charter provisions that modify the conventional rules of board
governance. For example, a firm could adopt a charter provision that
provides for governance by the firm's five largest shareholders. Or, it
could permit shareholders to elect the CEO directly, while also elect-
ing an advisory board of outsiders to monitor the CEO's performance
and make recommendations about when and by whom the CEO
should be replaced. (Under this system, instead of turning control of
the firm over to directors, shareholders simply pay them for their ad-
vice.) Alternatively, shareholders could maintain an option on firm
control by delegating broad authority to the board while retaining the
right to veto board decisions. This approach would grant the board a
default right to manage the firm while still requiring the directors
to comply with any shareholder resolution approved by holders of a
note 60, at 1164; and Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments:
Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 778-79 (1982).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7 (discussing board governance as a default
rule and a feature of public corporations).
71 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
72 Id. § 102(b) (1) (emphasis added). For an example of how corporate partici-
pants sometimes contract around the default rules of director governance, see Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (describing a complex governance agreement
adopted at a financially troubled firm that limited the directors' authority), affd sub
nom. Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
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majority of the firm's shares. Less ambitiously, promoters could sim-
ply employ charter provisions that preclude boards from adopting
poison pills or similar takeover defenses without shareholder ap-
proval. Any or all of these measures are available to the incorporator
who believes investors want greater control over boards.
Remarkably, public corporations as a rule do none of these1 3
things. To the contrary, when the charters of public firms do depart
from the default rules of corporate governance, they almost always
move in the opposite direction through modifications that strengthen
directors' power vis-a-vis shareholders. This pattern has been observ-
able to some extent since the days of Berle and Means. It has become
far more visible in recent years, however, as a result of several newly
published studies of the charter provisions of firms selling shares to
outside investors in IPOs.1
4
IPO studies have consistently found that, in the years following the
takeover battles of the 1970s and early 1980s, a substantial and in-
creasing percentage of firms "going public" have chosen to include
provisions in their charters making it more difficult for either the
firm's shareholders or a hostile acquirer to oust an incumbent board.
A common example is a "staggered" board structure that allows only
one-third of the firm's directors to face reelection in any one year.
Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, depending on the time
period observed, the incidence of IPO firms whose charters provided
for a staggered board rose from around one-third to over eighty per-
cent.
7 6
73 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1397 (2001) (observing that charter prohibitions that
restrict directors' power to use poison pills "are so rare as to be almost nonexistent for
research purposes").
74 Id. at 1377-78 (analyzing takeover defenses adopted by IPO firms); Robert
Daimes & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protections
in IPOs, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 95-110 (2001) (evaluating antitakeover provisions in
IPO charters); Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO
Firms, 57J. FIN. 1857, 1858-62 (2002) (examining the incidence of antitakeover meas-
ures in IPO firms).
75 This requires a hostile bidder who wants to try to replace incumbent directors
via a proxy battle to win at least two elections and to endure a delay of at least one year.
See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 32, at 902-24 (discussing staggered boards and
their negative effect on takeover bids).
76 Coates, supra note 73, at 1376 (finding that the incidence of staggered boards
in IPO firms rose from 34% in 1991-92 to 82% in 1999); see also Daines & Klausner,
supra note 74, at 95 (noting that more than 40% of firms evaluated in the authors'
sample adopted a staggered board); Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1861, 1884
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Such findings offer at least two important insights into the debate
between those who support the monitoring model of the board and
those who favor the idea that boards also serve a mediating function.
First, they further undermine the positive version of the monitoring
board hypothesis. A recent study has concluded, for example, that
since the development of the poison pill, allowing directors the addi-
tional protection of a staggered board structure makes it virtually im-
possible for a hostile bidder to acquire control of a target firm
through a proxy contest.77 Thus, as more public firms adopt a stag-
gered board structure, it becomes increasingly unrealistic to argue
that directors of such firms are driven to serve only shareholders' in-
terests out of the fear that, if they do not, they will be disciplined in an
active market for corporate control.
Second, and more importantly, the observation that firms going
public for the first time prefer to adopt charter provisions enhancing
board authority also poses a direct challenge to any normative claim
for the superiority of the monitoring board. Prospective investors in
an IPO can readily determine the contents of the firm's charter and
the degree to which directors are insulated from shareholder chal-
lenge. If investors believe that ceding control to a board will likely re-
duce their future returns, they can adjust their willingness to pay for
the firm's shares accordingly. As a result, corporate promoters plan-
ning to take their firms public have every incentive to structure their
firms to appeal to outside investors. If they do not, it will be the pro-
moters, not the investors, who make less money.
The end result is that, when the public corporation is first being
created-in effect, when the various groups that expect to participate
in the firm are negotiating the terms of their future relationships-
the parties that comprise "the firm" have a mutual interest in selecting
efficient governance rules that maximize the firm's expected future
value. Contrary to the predictions of the monitoring model, they pick
78rules that protect director pnmacy.
(reporting that 53% of sampled IPO firms from 1988-1992 had at least one antitake-
over provision, while over 36% included a staggered board provision in their charter).
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 32, at 890-91 (stating that from 1996-2000, no
hostile bidders were successful in gaining control of a firm with a staggered board
through a proxy contest).
7 Several recent studies of firm behavior suggest a similar pattern in selecting
states of incorporation. Corporate law is mostly state law, and a corporate promoter
can select which state's laws will apply to her firm by choosing a state of incorporation.
If shareholder primacy rules increase investors' returns (as the monitoring model im-
plies), we would expect to see public stock promoters incorporate their firms in states
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This empirical reality casts new light on the monitoring versus
mediating board debate. IPO studies establish that, at the IPO stage,
investors display a "revealed preference" for director primacy rules in
public corporations. In lay terms, investors act as if they value corpo-
rate governance rules that place control of the corporation firmly in
the boards' hands more than rules that leave more control in share-
holders' hands. Neoclassical economic analysis generally presumes
that revealed preferences reflect actual preferences .7  As a result, IPO
charter studies support a presumption in favor of the claim that inves-
tors in public corporations not only do not object to governance by a
mediating board-they actually desire it.
This claim finds further support in what might be viewed as a re-
cent natural experiment: the rise and subsequent swift fall of an ac-
tive market for corporate control in the 1970s and early 1980s. As
noted earlier, it was only after the development of the financed hostile
tender offer that directors of public firms became subject to
what business scholars soon were enthusiastically describing as the
"discipline" of that market."" The business world, however, declined
to warmly embrace the prospect of weaker board control. Within a
with rules that favor shareholder control over director primacy. For example, promot-
ers might be attracted to California, which has no antitakeover statute and has not yet
validated an important type of poison pill. See Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1865
(describing how California has no significant antitakeover laws); Guhan Subramanian,
The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate
and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1854-55 (2002) (observing that
California has no antitakeover statutes). Conversely, they would avoid incorporating in
states like Delaware and Nevada, which reinforce director primacy through antitake-
over statutes and case law. See Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1865 (describing how
Delaware law discourages takeovers); Subramanian, supra, at 1856-57 (describing how
Nevada law discourages takeovers). Instead, the opposite pattern exists-states with
relatively strong director primacy rules do better at attracting new firms and retaining
old ones than states whose laws seem more "shareholder friendly." See, e.g., Lucian
Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1777, 1821 (2002) (finding that states with antitakeover statutes are more likely to re-
tain in-state companies and attract out-of-state companies); Field & Karpoff, supra note
74, at 1865 (noting that twenty-three percent of IPO firms reincorporated in a new
state within two years before going public, with the majority reincorporating from
states with relatively unrestricted takeover laws to states with more restrictive laws);
Subramanian, supra, at 1844 (noting migration toward states with antitakeover provi-
sions, while also noting some migration away from states with especially severe anti-
takeover laws).
79 For the classic formulation of the idea that preferences can be revealed through
actual market choices, see PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1947).
80 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61 (discussing the rise of an active market
for corporate control).
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few years, state legislatures responded to hostile tender offers by pass-
ing a variety of antitakeover statutes; directors responded by deploying
poison pills and other defenses; corporate promoters responded by
adopting antitakeover charter provisions in new firms; and courts re-
sponded by approving most of these developments.8
To the observer who subscribes to the monitoring model, the dec-
ades between the rise of the large public firm in the 1920s and the
appearance of the hostile tender offer in the 1970s-decades during
which directors of public corporations were largely insulated from ex-
ternal threats to their incumbency-may seem an unfortunate period
in which boards refused to act as shareholders' agents and instead
stood by as executives built lavish empires and otherwise imposed
agency costs" on equity investors. Conversely, the appearance of a
lively takeover market in the 1970s and 1980s was a welcome devel-
opment that improved corporate governance by allowing sharehold-
ers to punish directors who failed in their monitoring role. From this
perspective, corporate America's subsequent wagon-circling response
in the form of poison pills, classified board provisions, and the like
(not to mention judges' and legislators' apparent acceptance of this
response) must seem both puzzling and disappointing.
The mediating model, however, offers a different interpretation
of these events. If director governance does indeed perform an im-
portant economic function by tying shareholders' hands in a fashion
that encourages other corporate team members' specific investments,
it makes sense that the business world would embrace corporate law's
default rules of director primacy in the decades prior to the control
battles of the 1970s and 1980s. It also makes sense that, when director
primacy was threatened by the unexpected advent of the hostile ten-
der offer, corporations responded quickly and effectively with poison
pills, staggered boards, and similar devices. Furthermore, it makes
sense that corporate regulators smiled benignly on this defensive re-
sponse. Finally, it makes sense that these director primacy protecting
strategies are now adopted not only by existing firms, but also by newly
created firms selling shares to public investors for the first time.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 61-69, 75-76 (assessing the response to the
market for corporate control).
82 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Histoy for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444 (2001) (discussing the "manager-oriented" model of gov-
ernance and arguing that the appeal of this model, popular in the 1930s through
1960s, was "largely destroyed" in the 1970s and 1980s).
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III. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
Empirical observations of corporate governance patterns, and es-
pecially studies of IPO charters, strongly suggest that the conventional
monitoring model fails to capture the reality of modern public corpo-
ration boards. At the positive level, IPO studies demonstrate that di-
rectors of newly public companies enjoy a degree of discretion to
sacrifice shareholders' interests to serve those of other constituencies
that is inconsistent on its face with the monitoring model's premise
that directors are shareholders' agents. At the normative level, IPO
studies cast doubt on whether shareholders even want directors to act
as their agents. At the time when they have the greatest leverage to
demand optimal corporate governance rules, investors display a re-
markably strong and consistent revealed preference for rules that
limit their own power and place control in the hands of a board in-
stead. This strongly suggests that the time has come for the monitor-
ing model to lose its privileged status.
Yet the observation that IPO studies make it unreasonable to con-
tinue to unhesitatingly rely on the monitoring model does not imply
that one can, without more, safely assume the validity of the mediating
model. Investors' revealed preference for governance rules that favor
director primacy support a presumption that investors in fact expect
such rules to make them better off. Presumptions can be overcome,
however. Thus, some theorists have suggested recently that IPO stud-
ies do not necessarily disprove the monitoring model because imper-
fections in the IPO market prevent investors from expressing their
real preferences for more shareholder control.83 Given the oddities of
the IPO market, including persistent underpricing, this argument has
some appeal.84
83 See, e.g., Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1885 (briefly discussing the possibility
that promoters adopt inefficient charter provisions); LUcIAN ARYE BEBCHUK,
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE CHOICE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ARRANGEMENTS 28 Uohn M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harv. Law Sch., Discus-
sion Paper No. 398, 2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_
center/corporate-governance/papers/pdf/No398.02.Bebchuk.pdf (arguing that asym-
metric information in the IPO market may explain why investors who dislike board
governance nevertheless cannot "punish" IPO firms that adopt director primacy rules
by discounting the price they are willing to pay for shares).
84 Perhaps the best-developed version of this argument can be found in a recent
paper by Lucian Bebchuk. See BEBCHUK, supra note 83. Using the example of anti-
takeover charter provisions, Bebchuk argues that firms may adopt inefficient provi-
sions that harm shareholders more than they benefit incumbent managers because it is
difficult for investors to observe the intrinsic values of firms. Id. Bebchuk hypothesizes
that high-value firms offer professional managers the opportunity to extract more in
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Thus the stage is set for what is likely to be the next round of the
"Great Debate": the search for persuasive evidence that, after ac-
counting for the ex ante effects of director primacy rules in encourag-
ing specific investments, as well as their ex post effects in increasing
agency costs, such rules actually leave investors worse off. Where can
we find such evidence?
This inquiry is only beginning. Nevertheless, it is essential to rec-
ognize from the start that at least two forms of evidence which are
commonly offered in support of the monitoring model nevertheless
cannot be relied upon to overcome the implications of PO studies.
First, the mediating model's hypothesis that shareholders enjoy a
net benefit from director primacy rules cannot be overcome by evi-
dence that, after shareholders have chosen to buy shares in a firm
governed by a mediating board, they sometimes complain ex post
about having given up control to that board. Shareholders obviously
can suffer after the fact from director primacy rules that allow boards
to favor other constituencies. Yet, the mediating model suggests how
shareholders may receive greater benefits ex ante if those same
rules encourage other constituencies to make extracontractual, sunk-
cost investments in the firm. Antitakeover provisions, for example,
can provide equity investors with an extremely valuable ex ante
benefit by encouraging professional managers to endure low-pay,
high-risk, long nights, and years of hard work with no vacations. Al-
though it is impossible to draft formal contracts that reliably elicit
"private benefits" (agency costs) than low-value firms. Id. As a result, antitakeover pro-
visions are proportionately more valuable to managers of high-value firms. Id. Never-
theless, because investors cannot directly observe firm values, they value all firms at the
average. Id. Similarly, when they observe antitakeover provisions, they discount their
willingness to pay for shares by the average cost of such provisions. The end result is a
cross-subsidy: antitakeover provisions are proportionately less costly to high-value firms
than low-value firms. If large enough, this cross-subsidy can make antitakeover provi-
sions cost-effective at large firms. And if high-value firms start adopting antitakeover
provisions, low-value firms may too, in order to avoid signaling that they are low-value.
Id.
Bebchuk's argument is intriguing but rests on strong assumptions. For example, it
assumes that investors cannot observe individual firms' values at all. Yet if this were
true, one would expect the IPO market to implode into a classic "market for lemons"
in which high-value firms refuse to participate because they do not receive full price
for their shares, while low-value firms-"lemons"-rush into the market. See generally
George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (discussing the incentive for sellers to market poor-quality
merchandise when buyers cannot judge the quality of goods, decreasing the average qual-
ity of goods and size of the market).
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such contributions, they can be essential to a business's success, and
even its survival.
Nevertheless, after the firm's managers have made sunk-cost in-
vestments in reliance on a firm's antitakeover defenses, shareholders
may be tempted to try to remove the defenses and sell their shares at a
premium to a bidder who will bring in a new management team. s5
Such attempts at ex post rent-seeking are hardly surprising. They
should not, however, be mistaken for evidence that shareholders do
not benefit from and prefer the mix of corporate governance rules they
elected into ex ante.
This analysis reveals the weakness in the arguments of commenta-
tors who point to such ex post evidence (e.g., shareholder proposals
to eliminate existing antitakeover defenses such as poison pills or clas-
sified boards) to prove that shareholders are harmed by antitakeover
provisions.8s Taken alone, the fact that shareholders sometimes pro-
test antitakeover rules in seasoned firms, or even try to remove them,
cannot overcome the presumption that investors generally accept di-
rector primacy rules at the IPO stage because they expect to receive a
net benefit. After all, Ulysses also complained ex post about his bind-
ings.
A second type of empirical evidence that is sometimes cited in
support of the monitoring model are findings that director primacy
rules allow nonshareholder groups to extract benefits from firms at
shareholders' expense. This evidence, however, cannot be relied
upon as support for the monitoring model once one acknowledges
the possibility of team production concerns in public corporations.
An example of this kind of empirical argument can be found in a re-
cent study of antitakeover defenses in IPO firms by Laura Field and
Jonathan Karpoff.s7 Field and Karpoff began their analysis by noting
the inherent tension between the monitoring model's prediction that
antitakeover provisions harm investors and the empirical observation
that many firms adopt such provisions at the IPO stage. Reflecting the
intellectual dominance of the monitoring model, Field and Karpoff
85 See supra text accompanying notes 24, 32-33 (discussing shareholder opportu-
nity to exploit managers' specific investment). Similarly, after shareholders have made
their specific investments, professional managers may be tempted to add new and un-
anticipated takeover defenses to the firm's charter in a mirror-image attempt to exploit
equity investors by "changing the rules in the middle of the game."
86 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 32, at 891-92 (asserting that shareholder
proposals to end staggered boards are evidence that this antitakeover device reduces
shareholder wealth).
87 Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1884-85.
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did not discuss-much less attempt to test-the mediating model's
hypothesis that antitakeover protections benefit shareholders at the
IPO stage by encouraging nonshareholders' specific commitments.
Instead, they focused primarily on distinguishing between two other
possible explanations for why IPO firms adopt antitakeover defenses:
(1) that market imperfections allow corporate promoters to opportu-
nistically insert, at investors' expense, provisions that reduce firm
value (the agency cost thesis) and (2) that antitakeover provisions
benefit shareholders by allowing them to pay executives lower salaries
(the substitution hypothesis).S8
Examining a sample of over one thousand firms that went public
between 1988 and 1992, Field and Karpoff tested how the presence of
an antitakeover defense correlated with executive compensation.
They found that IPO firms with defenses paid their executives more in
salary in the year prior to the IPO than did firms without defenses.
From this, they concluded that antitakeover protections do not serve
as an efficient substitute for executive compensation, but instead allow
executives to inefficiently impose greater agency costs on a firm's
shareholders. 89
Such findings are susceptible to another interpretation, however.
Team production analysis suggests that antitakeover defenses will
provide greater ex ante benefits to shareholders in companies where
employees' firm-specific investments are more important to business
success. Thus, if high salaries reflect the relative importance of hu-
man capital investment relative to financial capital, it makes sense to
88 Id. at 1867. Field and Karpoff ran a second test to determine whether antitake-
over provisions increased shareholders' ex post returns by giving boards bargaining
power to demand higher premiums from would-be acquirers. See id. at 1873-81 (find-
ing the evidence did not support this theory); see also supra text accompanying notes
64-68 (discussing and rejecting the argument that antitakeover defenses are consistent
with the monitoring model because directors use them to prevent shareholders from
selling at too low a price).
Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1873. Field and Karpoff also found that anti-
takeover provisions are negatively correlated with the age of the firm's CEO and with
the percentage of stock retained by the firm's officers and directors after the offering
is complete. Id. at 1868, 1870 tbl.VI. They concluded that this finding also supported
the agency cost thesis, on the theory that a young CEO is more eager to protect her
ability to opportunistically extract private benefits than an older CEO, and that man-
agers also are more likely to impose value-reducing antitakeover defenses on a firm if
they own relatively few shares. Id. at 1870-71; see infra note 90 (discussing how these
findings also support mediating theory).
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expect more antitakeover provisions at firms where managers also are
paid higher salaries. 90
As this example illustrates, almost any variable one might use as a
proxy for the inefficient "agency costs" that managers supposedly ex-
tract from unwilling shareholders under the monitoring model is also
likely to serve as a proxy for the efficient and legitimate benefits man-
agers receive from mediating boards, with shareholders' ex ante bless-
ing, under the mediating model. Put differently, the mediating
model of the board suggests that when managers receive a greater
share of corporate rents-whether in the form of high salaries, job se-
curity, or use of a corporate jet-this is not prima facie evidence of in-
efficiency any more than greater dividends paid to shareholders are
evidence of inefficiency. Rather, both types of payments reflect effec-
tive team production under a mediating board.
Studies finding a correlation between director primacy rules and
returns to nonshareholders accordingly provide just as much empiri-
cal support for the mediating model as they do for the monitoring
model. It seems unlikely that these kinds of correlations can provide
insight into whether IPO firms that adopt antitakeover provisions are
harming or helping their shareholders in the process.91
90 It also makes sense that antitakeover defenses are negatively correlated with
CEO age, since a younger CEO who hopes to be around for some time has more
to lose from ex post shareholder opportunism, and that antitakeover provisions are
negatively correlated with executive stock ownership, as executives who retain enough
stock to control the firm do not need antitakeover provisions to protect their specific
investments because their voting rights accomplish this. See supra note 89.
91 For a different problem that can occur in such studies, see Dames & Klausner,
supra note 74, at 95-113. In this study, the authors attempted to test whether antitake-
over defenses were adopted to protect executives' "private benefits" (a phrase that in-
corporates the possibility that executives rely on mediating boards to provide them
with an extracontractual share of the firm's surplus, as predicted by the mediating
model). Daines and Klausner assumed that the magnitude of private benefits in-
creased when the firm's founder was still CEO at the IPO stage. Id. They found a
negative correlation between the presence of antitakeover defenses and a founder
CEO, and concluded that a desire to protect executive private benefits could not
explain the use of defenses. Id. Founder CEOs, however, are likely to be older than
non-founder CEOs. See Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1859 (noting that the aver-
age age of firms "going public" is eighteen years, implying that founders who are still
CEOs at the IPO stage have been at the helm for nearly two decades). Thus, a founder
CEO may in fact have less to lose from a takeover than a younger CEO brought in to
replace the founder. Daines and Klausner's results accordingly can be read to support
the mediating board hypothesis that IPO firms use takeover defenses to efficiently
protect the interests of executives who make specific investments that cannot be pro-
tected by formal contracts.
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How then might one go about investigating whether antitakeover
defenses and other director primacy rules adopted at the IPO stage
inefficiently harm investors, as supporters of the monitoring model
have claimed? A second element of the Field and Karpoff study
suggests a strategy that deserves further investigation. This strategy
would not rely on shareholders' ex post (and possibly opportunistic)
behavior as a means of gauging efficiency, nor would it look for corre-
lations between antitakeover defenses and nonshareholder benefits
and assume that anything benefiting nonshareholders must have
come at the shareholders' expense. Instead, it would examine how
antitakeover defenses affect firm value directly by examining how the
adoption of such defenses at the IPO stage influences subsequent firm
performance.
Consider how, under ideal circumstances, such a study might be
structured. First, one would pull together a sample of firms on the
verge of going public that elected to include antitakeover defenses in
their charters. (The promoters of these firms presumably believe that
antitakeover defenses increase net firm value.) Then, one would di-
vide the sample into two subgroups: the first one would be instructed
to eliminate antitakeover provisions from their charters, while the
second (the control group) would be permitted to retain them. Then
one would make a longitudinal study of the operating and stock-price
performance of each group over some significant period of time-say,
ten years. If the firms that were allowed to keep their antitakeover
provisions performed better on average, one could conclude that di-
rector primacy does indeed increase firm value. Conversely, if these
firms did worse, one could conclude, in accord with the monitoring
model, that antitakeover defenses are inefficient.
As a practical matter, of course, such a study is impossible. Re-
searchers cannot dictate to corporate promoters what antitakeover
provisions they may or may not put in their charters.9' Nevertheless,
Field and Karpoff attempted the next best thing, examining how the
presence of antitakeover defenses at the IPO stage is related to the
92 As an alternative, experimenters might try to offer some valuable inducement
in order to change promoters' behavior. This approach raises other difficulties, how-
ever: even if the experimenter could convince a foundation to fund a grant large
enough to bribe a test group of firms into changing their charters, the problem of self-
selection remains, as well as the issue of controlling for the wealth advantages enjoyed
by firms accepting the bribes.
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subsequent operating performance of those firms in the following five
93
years.
Their results offer an important challenge to the monitoring
model. As Field and Karpoff observed, the agency cost explanation
for antitakeover defenses, which relies on the monitoring model, im-
plies that takeover defenses that insulate the firm's executives and di-
rectors from the corporate control market should weaken subsequent
overall firm performance by encouraging inefficient shirking and
stealing.94 The agency cost explanation accordingly predicts that IPO
firms with antitakeover defenses should experience poor subsequent
operating results compared to similar firms without defenses.95
Field and Karpoff, however, observed the opposite result: the post-
IPO performance of firms with takeover defenses tended to be better
than the performance of firms without such defenses, especially in the
first three years following the IPO.96 As Field and Karpoff duly noted,
this result was "inconsistent with the notion that takeover defenses at
the time of the IPO contribute to poor operating performance."97 It is
consistent, however, with the mediating model.9
The mediating model posits that, by adopting antitakeover
provisions, IPO firms may offer additional assurance to executives,
employees, and other stakeholders that they can make sunk-cost
93 Field & Karpoff, supra note 74, at 1881-83. Operating performance was meas-
ured by the firm's operating return on assets compared to a control firm with similar
characteristics but no defenses. Id.
94 Id. at 1857.
95 Id. at 1881. Implicit in this prediction is the assumption that antitakeover de-
fenses cannot provide offsetting benefits, such as encouraging nonshareholders' spe-
cific investments, that improve subsequent firm performance.
96 Id. at 1881-83.
97 Id. at 1883.
98 Such results are especially striking because attempts to measure how antitake-
over defenses enhance firm value are likely to be plagued by false negatives due to selec-
tion bias. This is because antitakeover provisions likely increase the value of some
firms (e.g., those most in need of stakeholders' extracontractual specific investments)
more than others. Individual firms should adopt the governance structures (e.g., clas-
sified board or unclassified board) optimal for that firm. A corollary is that we may not
see any subsequent performance difference between firms with and without antitake-
over defenses because firms that decline to adopt such defenses should not suffer any
relative disadvantage. Field and Karpoff's finding that IPO-stage defenses are associ-
ated with better operating performance accordingly provides even stronger evidence
in support of the mediating model than appears on first inspection. It also suggests
that, for some reason, firms that could benefit from the adoption of antitakeover de-
fenses are not doing so. For a potential explanation, see Coates, supra note 73, at 1336
(arguing that the adoption of antitakeover defenses is determined in part by whether
an IPO firm is advised by a high-quality law firm with experience in the field).
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commitments in relative safety. If this promise of security promotes
investment in the firm, the result may be to improve the firm's subse-
quent operating results, especially in the years immediately following
the IPO when the uncertainty surrounding any new venture makes it
especially difficult to protect specific investments through formal con-
tract. Thus, shareholders get exactly what they hope and expect to get
by submitting to board governance-a flourishing public corpora-
tion.9
This is not to suggest that Field and Karpoff's test of operating re-
sults provides definitive proof of the superiority of the mediating
model. Correlation is not causation, and there are competing expla-
nations for why IPO antitakeover defenses might be associated with
superior operating performance in a firm's early years. Neverthe-
less, while further empirical study of the effects of director primacy
rules on firm value can be expected to run into such difficulties and
uncertainties, the point is that further empirical work can, and
should, be done. Until it is, corporate scholars cannot safely rely on
even the normative version of the monitoring model of the board.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary corporate theorists face a quandary. For the past
two decades, much of the scholarly literature on corporate govern-
ance has relied, explicitly or implicitly, on the monitoring model of
the corporate board. The temptation to do this is understandable-
the monitoring model offers an appealingly simple story about the
nature of the firm, with shareholders as "principals" and directors
as their "agents." This simple story can be easily explained to both
laypeople and law students, including the students who manage
most law reviews. Moreover, the monitoring model implies that
one can measure "good" corporate governance according to the easily
Similar support for the mediating model can be found in a recent study of
firms that announced plans to create a second class of stock with limited voting rights.
Such dual-class firms represent an extreme form of public shareholder disenfran-
chisement. Nevertheless, the study found that firms that adopted dual class structures
enjoyed abnormally positive stock market and operating returns in the four years fol-
lowing the announcement. See generally Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, The Effect
of Dual Class Recapitalization on Long-Run Stock Returns (Apr. 21, 2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author); Stout, supra note 25, at 855.
100 In an informal discussion with the author, John Coates has suggested an alter-
native explanation for Field and Karpofi's results: high-quality law firms tend to advise
their clients to use antitakeover provisions for reasons unrelated to efficiency, and bet-
ter-performing firms tend to hire high-quality law firms.
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observed variable of share price. As a result, it allows researchers to
argue that empirical studies of how changes in corporate law or struc-
ture influence share price provide persuasive evidence of what is good
or bad for the corporate sector as a whole.
Nevertheless, several recent developments indicate that it is no
longer wise (if it ever was) to assume that the monitoring model cap-
tures either the positive reality of how corporate boards work or the
normative desideratum of how they should work. First, theoretical
work in economics on the problem of contracting for specific invest-
ment in team production has breathed new intellectual life into the
competing view of directors' roles as mediating hierarchs, rather than
as shareholders' agents. Second, widespread use of the poison pill,
especially when combined with corporations' increasing penchant for
classified board structures, has highlighted how shareholders do in-
deed cede control over public firms to boards of directors, as pre-
dicted by the mediating model. Third, empirical inquiries into
contemporary corporate governance patterns-especially recent stud-
ies of IPO charters-provide strong evidence that shareholders in
public firms not only cede control to boards, but prefer to cede control
to them.
Investors' revealed preference for director primacy rules at the
IPO stage may possibly reflect imperfections in the IPO market rather
than investors' true preferences. Yet the theoretical possibility that
investors' revealed preferences might not reflect their true preferences
does not establish that investors' revealed preferences do not reflect
their true preferences. Before dismissing the strong and consistent
results of IPO studies as irrelevant to the mediating versus monitoring
board debate, it seems reasonable to demand some empirical coun-
terweight, in the form of evidence that investors-despite their appar-
ent enthusiasm for director primacy rules-in fact suffer from them
over the life of the firm.
That counterweight remains missing. Meanwhile, casual observa-
tions of the empirical landscape-including the observations that (1)
the default rules of corporate law favor director primacy; (2) public
firms almost never opt out of these default rules; (3) public firms
in fact increasingly add charter provisions to reinforce directors'
authority; (4) charter provisions are added not only in seasoned firms,
but also in IPOs; and (5) initial tests conclude that IPO antitakeover
defenses actually improve firm performance, instead of harming it
-all suggest that, at least for now, the mediating model enjoys the
empirical high ground.
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The realities of modem corporate life accordingly strongly rec-
ommend that the monitoring model of the board lose the privileged
status it has enjoyed during the past two decades, at least among aca-
demics. The monitoring versus mediating board debate has not, of
course, been resolved. Nevertheless, it is time to move the debate
away from assertion and speculation, and toward empirical work that
can allow us to test each model's validity. In the interim, the burden
of proof should be shifted to those who would defend the monitoring
model.
